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IV 
The Utah Insurance Commissioner, acting as the liquidator ("Liquidator") of 
Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC"), respectfully submits this reply brief in 
support of his appeal from the summary judgment entered in favor of CSX. 
ARGUMENT 
In his opening brief, the Liquidator established that the trial court erred in holding 
that, as a matter of law, CSX had provided SAIC with new and contemporaneous 
consideration in exchange for the three payments that SAIC made to CSX. As explained 
by the Liquidator, the policy of the new-and-contemporaneous-consideration defense is 
to allow companies to acquire goods and services even though they are close to 
liquidation. Because CSX did not provide SAIC with anything new 1h,M augmented the 
estate, and because SAIC did not make the payments to CSX contemporaneously with the 
acquisition of the debt, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
CSX. 
I. CSX DID NOT PROVIDE NEW CONSIDERATION TO SAIC FOR THE 
$308,000 IN PAYMENTS IT RECEIVED. 
The Liquidator's opening brief establishes that the district court erred first by 
holding that, as a matter of law, the consideration provided by CSX was new. CSX 
responds to the Liquidator's arguments by arguing that any consideration is, by 
definition, new. CSX also argues that it is improper to look to federal bankruptcy 
decisions for guidance in this matter. Next CSX suggests that even if all consideration is 
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not inherently new, the settlement agreement in this case provided SAIC with something 
new. As shown below, these arguments are incorrect. 
A. MERE LEGAL CONSIDERATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
A DEFENSE UNDER THE VOIDABLE PREFERENCE STATUTE. 
CSX contends that the new and contemporaneous consideration defense set forth 
in Utah Code Annotated § 31 A-27-321(4)(a) precludes the Liquidator from recovering 
the $308,000 in payments made to CSX. See Opposition Brief at 13-19. CSX supports 
its contention by focusing on the purported legal meaning of the word "consideration" 
and claiming that the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter which included a release of 
"future" claims provided the necessary new and contemporaneous consideration. 
CSX's arguments miss the point. The question in this case is not whether the 
settlement agreement between CSX and the Liquidator was supported by adequate 
consideration. Rather, the question before the Court is whether any consideration 
provided was "new" and "contemporaneous." 
CSX argues repeatedly that "if there was consideration, it was by definition 
'new.'" Opposition Brief at 20-21. See also, e.g., id. at 20 ("there is simply no 
consideration without it being new"); id. at 21 ("by definition the consideration was 
new"). However, after arguing at length in its opposing brief that a court should give 
meaning and effect to every word in a statute, CSX fails to give any significance to the 
words "new" and "contemporaneous," which are included in Utah's statute. Instead, 
CSX focuses all of its attention on the meaning of the word "consideration." However, 
more is required under Utah's statute than that mere "consideration" was given. CSX 
had the burden to establish that any consideration given was also "new" and 
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"contemporaneous" to qualify for this defense. The question is whether CSX enhanced 
the estate by providing something new. However, if CSX's argument is accepted, then 
the word "new" would be written out of the statute, and the new and contemporaneous 
consideration exception would sw<i I low up the preference statute. Creditors who wanted 
to get a large payment on the eve of a liquidation would simply rush to enter into a 
settlement agreement with the insolvent entity and then claim that something of value 
(i.e. "consideration") was exchanged for the payment the creditor received. The Court 
should reject CSX's attempt to rewrite the statute by deleting the word "new." 
B. UTAH'S LIQUIDATION STATUTE WAS BASED UPON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW, AND IT IS APPROPRIATE TO LOOK TO 
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY COURT DECISIONS FOR GUIDANCE. 
CSX attempts to avoid the numerous and persuasive cases cited by the Liquidator 
by arguing that they do not apply because they analyze different language in the federal 
bankruptcy code. First, the Utah liquidation statute was modeled after federal bankruptcy 
law, and it is perfectly appropriate to lo< >L lo bankruptcy decisions for guidance. 
Because voidable preference statutes under state insurance liquidation law are very 
similar to the voidable preference statute under the federal bankruptcy code, other courts 
that have hid to determine whether a transfer is preferential under state insurance law 
have stated that "it is customary to look to federal bankruptcy law tor guidance." See e.g. 
Pine Top Ins. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav., 969 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1992). 
Indeed, CSX itself relies on bankruptcy decisions when it believes those decisions 
The Liquidator is not aware of any cases that specifically construe the meaning of the 
phrase "new and contemporaneous consideration" in Utah's statute. 
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support its position. See, e.g., Opposing Brief at 23 (citing In re Stephens 242 B.R. 508 
(D.Kan. 1999)). 
More importantly, while the bankruptcy code uses the word "value" and the Utah 
statute uses the word "consideration," this is not the language that matters. The question 
in this case is whether the consideration was "new" and "contemporaneous," and in this 
regard both statutes use precisely the same words: "new" and "contemporaneous." 
The bankruptcy cases relied upon by the Liquidator are cited for the purpose of 
establishing that the "new" and "contemporaneous" components of the defense cannot be 
met. In other words, CSX's attempt to distinguish the word "consideration" from the 
word "value," as used in the bankruptcy code, does not defeat the Liquidator's argument 
that the new and contemporaneous consideration defense has no application in this case. 
Indeed, in the Pan Trading case cited in the Liquidator's opening brief, the court 
references both the terms "new consideration" and "new value" in concluding that 
settlement payments were not new and contemporaneous. See In re Pan Trading 
Corporation, 125 B.R. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court stated: 
The payments in the instant case bear none of the earmarks of a 
contemporaneous exchange. The parties to the litigation settled upon a 
penalty to cure violations and then they set forth a schedule for payment. 
There was no new consideration, no contemporaneous exchange for 
new value, only payment upon an antecedent debt to satisfy a fine on long 
standing violations. Id. at 876-77 (emphasis added). 
In sum, as shown below, numerous federal courts have decided the precise 
question now before the Court and have analyzed the identical words at issue in this 
appeal. Those well-reasoned and persuasive decisions demonstrate that the new-and-
contemporaneous-consideration defense does not apply in this case because the payments 
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by SAIC to CSX were neither for "new" nor "contemporaneous" consideration, but rather 
were made for an antecedent debt that SAIC owed to CSX. 
C. CSX'S ARGUMENT THAT "NEW" CONSIDERATION WAS 
PROVIDED TO SAIC IN EXCHANGE FOR THE $308,000 FAILS 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
CSX argues that it gave "new" consideration to SAIC because CSX gave 
up the right to prosecute its existing claims against SAIC, obtain a judgment 
against SAIC, and execute on that judgment, and because CSX gave SAIC a 
release from all further claims that could be asserted against it. See Opposition 
Brief at 20. As explained below, this argument fails as a matter of law. 
1. CSX's Forbearance from Asserting Legal Rights Against SAIC Such 
as Giving Up the Right to Obtain a Judgment and Execute on that 
Judgment Did Not Constitute New Consideration. 
The law is well settled by courts adjudicating preference cases that forbearing 
from asserting pre-existing legal rights does not constitute new value, or in this case, new 
consideration. See, for example, In re Aero-Fastener, Inc., 177 B.R. 120, 138 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1994) and the numerous cases cited therein. The reason is that forbearing from 
asserting an already existing legal right usually does not provide any tangible value to an 
estate. As stated by one court: 
"When a creditor threatens to exercise a legal remedy against a debtor, and 
in exchange for not so doing extracts a payment for antecedent debt, 
nothing of value has accrued to the debtor estate to compensate other 
creditors for the loss of that payment.... Such a transaction falls squarely 
within the ambit of the preference law, rather than within its exceptions." 
(Citation omitted). 
In re Bangert, 226 B.R. 892, 903 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998). 
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Likewise, in Aero-Fastener, the court held that a creditor's forbearance from going 
forward on its bulk attachment motion failed to qualify as a new and contemporaneous 
exchange of value. In re Aero-Fasterner, 177 B.R. at 139. Similarly, in In re Air 
Conditioning, Inc. of Stuart, 845 F.2d 293, 298 (11th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 
993 (1988), the court held that an agreement by an undersecured creditor to forego its 
right to foreclose on collateral could not be treated as new value within the meaning of a 
preference statute. 
Likewise, in In re Bioplasty, Inc., 155 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993), the 
court found that the creditors' dismissal of class action securities claims and a release of 
an injunction in exchange for payments made pursuant to a settlement agreement did not 
constitute new value, even where the debtor has considered the expenses of litigation in 
deciding to settle the matter. The court stated: 
Although the settlement agreement states that the debtor considered the 
expenses of litigation in settling, and that the debtor specifically denies any 
wrongdoing, I find that the most significant factor in settling the class 
action suit was the risk that the debtor would be found liable. As paragraph 
V of the settlement agreement states, the debtor clearly considered 'the 
uncertainty and the risk of the outcome in any litigation, especially a 
complex case such as this.' Certainly the debtor's driving concern in 
settling the class action suit, as in any large commercial dispute, was the 
risk of liability. The settlement payments were made in light of such risk, 
and therefore were on account of the antecedent debt. 
Id. at 499. 
In this case, CSX's decided to forego prosecuting its claims against SAIC 
and obtaining and executing on a judgment. However, in so doing CSX was 
merely forbearing from asserting pre-existing legal rights. The law is clear that 
such a forbearance does not constitute new consideration. 
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2. CSX's Release of Claims In Favor of SAIC Did Not Constitute New 
Consideration. 
CSX attempts to avoid the cases and principles cited above by contending that 
new consideration was provided because SAIC was given a release which precluded past, 
present, or future asbestos-related claims being asserted against it, and which saved the 
parties litigation expenses. Opposition Brief at 20-21. Similar arguments have 
repeatedly been rejected by the courts and for good reason. As explained in In re Energy 
CO-OP, Inc., 832 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1987), a release in a preference action likely is 
worthless to other creditors because the release does not free up any assets for other 
creditors because the debtor could not have paid the preferred claim in any event. Id. at 
1004. All the payment for the settlement and release does is to deplete the estate at the 
other creditors' expense, which frustrates the intent behind the preference statute which is 
to promote an equitable distribution among all creditors and not to favor any one 
particular creditor. Id. See also In re Bownic Insulation Contractors, Inc., 134 B.R. 261, 
265-66 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (the release of an unsecured claim, which included a 
claim in subrogation, did not fall within the new value exception because the release 
provided no benefit to the estate). 
Likewise, in the case at bar, CSX's release of unsecured claims in favor of SAIC 
did not provide any tangible benefit to SAIC's estate. Rather, SAIC's payment of 
$308,000 to CSX diminished the liquidation estate thereby harming other creditors of 
Only asbestos-related claims were covered by the settlement agreement. CSX did not 
release claims for environmental and other losses, and CSX has submitted claims in the 
SAIC liquidation for such losses. 
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SAIC's estate. The new and contemporaneous consideration defense simply is not 
intended to apply in such circumstances. 
CSX also argues that because the release contained in the October 14, 1991 
Settlement Letter included "future" claims, as opposed to just past or present claims, this 
satisfies the "new consideration" requirement of the defense. See Opposition Brief at 22. 
In so arguing, CSX maintains that future claims cannot already be in existence because 
they are yet unknown and because SAIC's liability on those claims has yet to be 
established. Id. 
However, in making this argument CSX fails to take into account that Utah's 
Insurance Code definitively establishes that claims which are unknown, contingent or 
unmatured are still nevertheless existing claims. The Utah Insurance Code defines 
"creditor" and "claim" as follows: 
(21) "Creditor" means a person, including an insured, having any claim, 
whether matured, unmatured, liquidated, unliquidated, secured, unsecured, 
absolute, fixed, or contingent. 
(14.5) "Claim," unless the context otherwise requires, means a request or 
demand on an insurer for payment of benefits according to the terms of an 
insurance policy. 
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-1-301(14.5) and (21) (1991).3 Applying these definitions, 
CSX was a creditor who had claims against SAIC pursuant to the terms of three excess 
insurance policies that SAIC issued in favor of CSX or its predecessors with coverage 
periods between July 14, 1979, and July 31, 1982. Moreover, CSX instituted a claim 
3
 Those same definitions are currently found in Utah Code Annotated, § 31A-1-301(19) 
and (28). 
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against SAIC by filing three lawsuits in which CSX made a demand on SAIC to pay any 
and all sums that were due and owing under these policies. The lawsuits, which were 
filed by CSX or its predecessors against SAIC in October of 1985 and January of 1990, 
demanded payment for all sums, including future claims. 
A similar argument to that asserted by CSX was considered and rejected by the 
court in In re Bioplasty, 155 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993). In that case, the 
defendant argued that while a claim itself can be disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, 
there can only be a debt on that claim where liability has been established. The court was 
not persuaded by that argument and stated as follows: 
The Bankruptcy Code defines a debt as a "liability on a claim," and defines 
a claim as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." (Citation 
omitted). The actions that gave rise to the class action suit gave the class 
action plaintiffs a right to pursue damages against Bioplasty. Even though 
any ultimate right to payment was disputed, contingent, unliquidated, and 
not reduced to judgment, such right still constitutes a claim under the 
Bankruptcy code, and "[w]here a claim exists, so does a debt." (Citation 
omitted). 
Id. at 498. Based on the foregoing, the court in Bioplasty found that the transfer in that 
case, which arose because of the alleged actions that gave rise to the lawsuit, was made 
on account of an antecedent debt. Therefore, the court rejected the application of the new 
value defense. Likewise, in this case, it makes no difference that the release provided by 
CSX to SAIC covered past, present, and/or future claims. SAIC made the $308,000 in 
payments to CSX to cover antecedent debts, and therefore, the new and contemporaneous 
consideration exception to the Liquidator's preference action is not applicable. 
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Based on the foregoing, CSX's argument that any consideration provided as a 
result of the settlement was "new," must be rejected. 
[I. CSX'S ARGUMENT THAT "CONTEMPORANEOUS" CONSIDERATION 
WAS PROVIDED TO SAIC IN EXCHANGE FOR THE $308,000 ALSO FAILS 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
As shown above, CSX did not provide "new" consideration for the substantial 
payments it received from SAIC. The summary judgment of the trial court must 
therefore be reversed on that basis alone. In addition, even if any consideration provided 
had been "new," it was not "contemporaneous." This provides a further, independent 
basis for reversal. 
A. THE PAYMENTS MADE BY SAIC COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
CONTEMPORANEOUS BECAUSE THEY WERE MADE WELL 
AFTER THE CLAIMS AROSE UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICIES 
AND AFTER LAWSUITS WERE FILED AGAINST SAIC IN 
CONNECTION WITH THOSE POLICIES. 
CSX attempts to avoid the "contemporaneous" requirement of the defense by 
arguing that its claims did not arise under the insurance policies, but rather they arose 
much later when CSX and SAIC settled the lawsuits and when each payment became due 
under the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter. See Opposition Brief at pp. 23-24. 
However, this contention is not correct as illustrated by In re Southmark Corp., 88 F.3d 
311 (5th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1057(1997). In the Southmark case, a 
corporation transferred funds into an escrow for disgruntled minority shareholders to 
reimburse them for their expenses incurred in a proxy lawsuit. When the corporation 
later filed bankruptcy and the shareholders were sued on a preference claim for the return 
of the escrow funds, the shareholders argued that the corporation did not have a "debt" to 
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repay their reimbursement claim until the corporation agreed to pay the reimbursement, 
and therefore the transfer was not for an "antecedent debt." The Fifth Circuit disagreed, 
noting that the shareholder "claim," and the corporation's corresponding reimbursement 
"debt," even if disputed and contingent, still arose at the time that the shareholders 
demanded reimbursement, not later when the corporation settled the dispute by agreeing 
to pay the reimbursements. "This conclusion is not only consistent with the statute and 
the case law, but also comports with the general observation that a settlement agreement 
resolves preexisting claims." Id. at 318. 
Similarly, the case of Buggage v. Yellow-Checker Cab Company, 623 So.2d 906 
(La. App. 1993), illustrates that the settlement of an insurance obligation is inextricably 
tied back to the claim itself. The court explained: 
LIGA's argument attempts to characterize a settlement as an 
obligation separate from the claim itself. However, a settlement is merely 
the method in which a claim is negotiated and satisfied by the parties prior 
to trial. The fact that a claim is agreed to immediately by the insurer, or 
negotiated over a period of time, does not negate the fact that the claim 
arose out of the insurance policy and is therefore a "covered claim" . . . 
Id. at 907. 
At the very latest, CSX's claim and SAIC's corresponding debt, even if it was 
disputed, contingent, or unmatured, arose when CSX's predecessors filed the three 
lawsuits against SAIC to recover damages under the insurance policies. For instance, in 
In re Winkle, 128 B.R. 529 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991), the court held that a contingent 
claim need not have been reduced to judgment in order for a claim and its corresponding 
debt to exist. In that case, the defendant had filed a lawsuit in which he made various 
allegations against the debtor and sought damages from him. As a result of that lawsuit, 
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vehicles and other property were transferred to the defendant. The debtor later filed for 
bankruptcy and the trustee brought a preference action against the defendant to recover 
certain transfers of the property. The defendant countered by arguing that no antecedent 
debt on the part of the debtor could exist because no judgment had ever been obtained 
against the debtor. The court rejected this argument and stated as follows: 
These allegations and requests for relief [set forth in the complaint] 
go beyond those necessary for the imposition of a constructive trust for the 
benefit of Palmer; they assert a right to payment against Kenneth Winkle 
and as such constitute a "claim" against him. The fact that such antecedent 
debt was not reduced to judgment prior to the transfer of the 1934 
automobile is, of course, irrelevant. It is sufficient that the claim was 
contingent or disputed. (Citation omitted). 
Id. at 536. 
In this case, the language of the insurance policies issued by SAIC provided 
coverage to CSX for three separate periods beginning on July 14, 1979, and ending on 
July 31, 1982. Following the expiration of these coverage periods, all of the events 
necessary to give rise to a claim or cause of action under those policies had occurred. 
Indeed, CSX alleged as much in the three separate lawsuits it filed against SAIC seeking 
judgments based on the insurance policies. The October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter did 
not create the basis for SAIC's liability to CSX. Rather, the events that occurred while 
these insurance policies were in effect created the basis for SAIC's liability. The October 
14, 1991 Settlement Letter only memorialized the agreement between SAIC and CSX as 
to the terms of payment of that pre-existing debt. Thus, the payments that were made by 
SAIC were not made contemporaneously with the debts. They were made well after the 
debts arose, and the new-and-contemporaneous defense does not apply as a matter of law. 
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B. EVEN IF CSX'S ARGUMENT IS ACCEPTED THAT THE 
SETTLEMENT OF THE LAWSUIT CREATED A NEW OBLIGATION, 
THE PAYMENTS MADE BY SAIC TO CSX STILL WERE NOT 
CONTEMPORANEOUS. 
CSX contends that the payments made to it could not have been for or on account 
of an antecedent debt because the settlement created a new debt between SAIC and CSX. 
See Opposition Brief at 24. Even if this were true, the payments were not made at the 
time the settlement was agreed to and were therefore not "contemporaneous" with that 
agreement. Thus, CSX's claims fail as a matter of law. 
First, the correspondence between counsel for CSX and SAIC indicates that the 
parties reached their settlement agreement on August 26, 1991. On that date, after 
several weeks of negotiation, counsel for SAIC received a letter from counsel for CSX 
accepting SAIC's prior offer to pay CSX $308,000 in three equal installments. (R. 468, 
469). The August 26, 1991 letter, from CSX's counsel, reads in pertinent part as follows: 
CSXT has asked me to convey to you that it is willing to accept 
Southern American's offer of $308,000 to settle CSXT's asbestos coverage 
litigation. CSXT understands that Southern American will make the 
payment in three installations due on October 31, November 30, and 
December 31, 1991, respectively. (I would suggest the first two payments 
be in the amount of $102,667 each and the last in the amount of $102,666). 
Please provide me, for CSXT's review, with Southern American's 
proposed settlement documents as soon as possible. 
(R. 469). Under Utah law the operative date for enforcement of a settlement is the date 
the settlement terms were agreed to, not the later "memorialization" date. See Murray v. 
State, 737 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Utah 1987). Indeed, had SAIC attempted to back out of the 
settlement subsequent to August 26, 1991, Defendant would have had the right to sue to 
enforce the August 26, 1991 agreement. Id. Accordingly, the October 14, 1991 
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Settlement Letter did not create the settlement agreement, it simply memorialized a prior 
agreement that had already been reached by the parties. Since the payments made from 
SAIC to CSX did not clear SAIC's checking account until November, December, and 
January of 1991, they were not contemporaneously made with the settlement agreement 
that was reached in August of 1991. 
However, even if the Court accepts CSX's assertion that the October 14, 1991 
Settlement Letter created a new obligation between SAIC and CSX, the three payment 
totaling $308,000 from SAIC to CSX still were not made contemporaneously with that 
agreement. CSX argues that the contemporaneous component of the defense is met 
because each debt of SAIC was incurred when each payment became due. See 
Opposition Brief at 24. However, the courts have rejected this approach and instead have 
held that in the case of an installment contract, a debtor becomes legally obligated on the 
date when the debtor originally undertakes the obligation, not when each payment 
becomes due. See In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Intercontinental 
Publications, Inc., 131 B.R. 544, 549 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991). 
Based on the foregoing, even if the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter created a 
new agreement between the parties, that agreement contained its own terms and 
consequences and carried with it a presumption of continued validity absent an explicit 
abrogation by the parties. Accordingly, CSX cannot now argue that at every point in 
time when a payment became due the parties created a new contract with identical terms 
to the one that was replaced moments earlier. In this case, SAIC still did not make 
contemporaneous payments under the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter because the 
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payments cleared4 SAIC's checking account 30, 53, and 94 days after October 14, 1991. 
See e.g. In re Carolyn's Kitchen, Inc., 209 B.R. 204,207 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997) 
(payments made three months and longer after settlement agreement were not 
contemporaneous); In re Independence Land Title Corp., 9 B.R. 394, 396 (Bankr. N.D. 
111. 1981) (perfection of security interest 2 months later held not to be contemporaneous). 
C. THE BANKRUPTCY CASES CITED BY CSX TO SUPPORT ITS NEW 
AND CONTEMPORANEOUS DEFENSE HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED 
SOUNDLY ARE FACTUALLY DISTINGUISHABLE AND 
REPRESENT THE MINORITY VIEW. 
CSX also argues that even if the Court considers bankruptcy law and the "new 
value" defense set forth in the bankruptcy code, it would still be entitled to prevail in this 
appeal. In support of this argument, CSX cites cases such as Lewis v. Diethorn, 893 F.2d 
648 (3rd Cir. 1990)5; and Nelson Co. v. Amquip Corp., 128 B.R. 930, 935 n. 13 (E.D. Pa. 
1991). See Opposition Brief at 15 n.l 1. However, these bankruptcy cases have been 
soundly criticized. For instance, in In re Bioplasty, Inc., 155 B.R. 495, 499 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1993), the court stated: 
Second, the defendants argue that the transfer was made, not on account of 
such antecedent debt, but rather to eliminate the costs and risks associated with 
litigation. The defendants rely on Lewis v. Diethorn, 893 F.2d 648, 650 (3d Cir. 
1990). Although Diethorn did hold that the settlement payments in the case before 
it were made in consideration for the termination of the lawsuit and release of a lis 
pendens, I am not persuaded by the Third Circuit's holding. The opinion 
The Liquidator submits that the clearance date of a check would be better representative 
of the date a check was actually received than the date which appears on the check. 
Lewis is also factually distinguishable from the case at bar because the payment in that 
case lifted an equitable lien from the property of the estate. Accordingly, the court 
based its finding on the fact that the property rose in value due to the removal of the 
equitable lien and therefore provided new value to the estate. However, in the case at 
bar, CSX had no liens on any of SAIC's property and SAIC received nothing of tangible 
value from CSX as a result of the settlement of the lawsuits. 
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contains no analysis whatsoever, and simply makes the conclusory statement 
that the payments were made for one reason rather than another. 
Even if I could be convinced that Diethorn reached the proper conclusion 
on the facts before it, I would distinguish it from the case before me today.. . . 
Certainly the debtor's driving concern in settling the class action suit, as in 
any large commercial dispute, was the risk of liability. The settlement 
payments were made in light of such risk, and therefore were on account of 
the antecedent debt. 
(Emphasis added). 
Similarly, in In re RDM Sports Group, Inc., 250 B.R. 805, 813-14 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2000), the court stated: 
The factual differences aside, Lewis is not binding authority in this 
circuit, and the Court declines to follow it. The bottom line is that Roadmaster 
incurred a legal obligation to DMAC long before the parties reached a 
settlement. See Upstairs Gallery, 167 B.R. at 918 ("A later compromise of the 
claim does not affect the time when the debt first arose.") (citation omitted). 
Because the Court is at a loss to explain how the settlement did or could 
destroy the antecedent quality of the underlying debt, it must reject DMAC's 
contention that there can be no transfer on account of an antecedent debt if the 
transfer was made in settlement of litigation. 
(Citations omitted and emphasis added). 
Moreover, in In re Lease-A-Fleet, Inc., 151 B.R. 341, 352 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 
1993), the court distinguished Lewis and Nelson and found that both of those decisions 
appeared "driven by the respective courts' conclusion that what the parties exchanged in 
the respective settlements was substantially equivalent." The court also noted that "the 
debtors in Lewis and Nelson were not prepared to 'give back' the benefits which they 
received in exchange for the payments made to them." The court explained: 
We doubt that Lewis stands for the principle that, merely because a 
payment is made by a debtor in settlement of litigation, a payment on an 
antecedent debt is necessarily transformed into a contemporaneous 
exchange. There is no question that a debtor's payment on an antecedent 
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debt where there has been no litigation with the creditor paid is within the 
scope of § 547(b)(2). There is also little doubt that a debtor's payment of 
antecedent debt in satisfaction of a creditor's judgment obtained through 
litigation would be within the scope of § 547(b)(2). It thus seems 
nonsensical to argue, as does MAC, that merely because the parties settled 
litigation, and this settlement resulted in payments to the creditor, the 
settlement creates a new obligation for which the payment may be deemed 
outside of the scope of § 547(b)(2) and as ca contemporaneous exchange for 
new value.'" 
Id. 
In sum, the bankruptcy cases cited by CSX to support its view have been 
criticized by numerous court and should not be followed. Furthermore, CSX's 
cases are factually distinguishable, and they represent the minority view. 
III. THE COURT MUST REJECT CSX'S ARGUMENTS THAT ANY NEW AND 
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION PROVIDED TO SAIC NEED NOT 
HAVE MEASURABLY ENHANCED SAIC'S ESTATE. 
CSX also contends in its Opposition Brief that if it provided new and 
contemporaneous consideration to SAIC's estate it need not show that such consideration 
measurably enhanced the estate, or provide any evidence of the amount of that 
enhancement. See Opposition Brief at 21, 25-26. However, if such an argument is 
accepted, it would undermine the important public policy embodied in the preference 
provisions of Utah's insurance liquidation statute. That policy is to protect individual 
policyholders and other claimants by not permitting certain creditors to place themselves 
in a superior position to other similarly situated creditors. Lincoln Towers Insurance 
Agency, Inc., 684 N.E.2d 900, 904 (111. App. 1997) ("avoiding preference of creditors is 
an aim of liquidation just as it is in federal bankruptcy [citation omitted] and liquidation 
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statutes are intended to protect individual policyholders and other claimants without 
permitting certain classes of creditors to place themselves in a superior position"). 
As stated above, the justification and purpose underlying the new and 
contemporaneous consideration defense "is that transferring collateral in exchange for an 
infusion of new capital does not harm existing creditors because it does not diminish the 
debtor's assets." If the Court accepts CSX's argument that new and contemporaneous 
consideration was provided by a release claims that could arise in the future, then CSX is 
only entitled to a defense as to that portion of the payments that went to those future 
claims.6 Any other interpretation would obliterate the Liquidator's power to set aside 
preferential transfers. As explained in In re Jet Florida Systems, Inc., 861 F.2d 1555, 
1559(11th Cir. 1988), a case in which the creditor argued that it should not have to 
provide any evidence of the amount of new value provided: 
American's interpretation of section 547(c)(1) would eviscerate the 
trustee's power to set aside preferential transfers. A creditor could retain 
the full value it received in the exchange if it could show merely that the 
debtor and creditor intended for the 'new value' to be worth something, 
however hypothetical or ephemeral. Section 547(c)(1) would become 
nothing more than a fraud provision. 
Moreover, there is nothing in the statutory language of Utah Code Annotated § 
31A-27-321(4) which indicates that a creditor need not show the amount of new and 
contemporaneous consideration provided. However, when considering the purpose 
6
 In this case, the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter unequivocally states that the 
$308,000 paid to CSX was "in full satisfaction of any claim by CSX against the policies 
issued by Southern for any losses due to Asbestos-Related Claims, past, present, or 
future, whether or not asserted in the Coverage Suits." (R. 471). Thus, it is apparent 
that a substantial portion of the payments made by SAIC were for the release of past or 
present claims. 
18 
behind Utah's preference statute, a creditor should be required to show that any new and 
contemporaneous consideration measurably enhanced the liquidation estate. Because 
CSX failed to present any evidence as to the amount of new and contemporaneous 
consideration that it contends augmented the estate, the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment in CSX's favor. 
IV. CSX'S ARGUMENT THAT THE LIQUIDATOR'S PREFERENCE ACTION IS 
BARRED BY THE ORDINARY COURSE DEFENSE ALSO FAILS. 
CSX argues alternatively in its Opposition Brief that if this Court should rule 
against it on the new and contemporaneous consideration exception, then it should 
nevertheless affirm the grant of summary judgment by the trial court based upon the 
ordinary course defense. See Opposition Brief at 27-34. As acknowledged by CSX, the 
trial court did not reach this issue. However, even if this Court chooses to address this 
question, the Court should still reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of CSX 
and remand for the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Liquidator on all issues 
except whether SAIC was insolvent at the time of the first two payments to CSX. 
As shown below, contrary to CSX's assertions, the three payments made by SAIC 
to CSX were not made within forty-five days after the debt was incurred, nor were they 
CSX wishes to have this Court reach these legal issues but does not wish to be bound by 
any determination made by this Court. Specifically, CSX argues that if this Court rules 
against CSX on these issues the matter should not be remanded for the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of the Liquidator but for further proceedings by the trial 
court. Such an approach is wasteful and unfair. If this Court decides the legal issues 
raised in this section of the brief, further proceedings (other than the entry of summary 
judgment) would be unwarranted. 
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incurred in the ordinary course of SAIC's insurance business or according to normal 
business terms.8 
A. The Three Payments by SAIC to CSX Were Made More than Forty-Five Days 
After the Debt to CSX Was Incurred. 
CSX contends that the three payments were not made for the original claims that 
were brought against SAIC by CSX because those claims were effectively "abandoned" 
as a result of the execution of the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter. See Opposition 
Brief at 29. However, the terms of the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter rebut CSX's 
argument. Section I of that letter provides as follows: 
In settlement of the Coverage Suits, the parties agree to the following 
payment provisions: 
1. Southern will pay CSX the sum of $308,000.00 as follows: 
$102,667.00 on October 31, 1991 
$102,667.00 on November 31, 1991 
$102,666.00 on December 31, 1991 
This sum shall be in full satisfaction of any claim by CSX against the 
policies issued by Southern for any losses due to Asbestos Related 
Claims, past, present, or future, whether or not asserted in the 
Coverage Suits. 
(Emphasis added). (R. 471). The foregoing language expressly states that the payments 
made by SAIC to CSX were intended to fully cover the original claims brought by CSX 
against SAIC, including those arising under the lawsuits that had been filed by CSX 
CSX also argues that the payment were not for antecedent debts. This argument fails 
for the reasons set forth in Section II and in the following section of this brief. 
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against SAIC, the last of which was filed in January of 1990, and those arising under the 
insurance policies issued by SAIC to CSX, the coverage periods of which ran from July 
14, 1979 through July 31, 1982. Thus, as a matter of law, the payments were for debts 
that preceded the settlement agreement. 
Second, CSX asserts that SAIC's liability to it could not have arisen prior to the 
execution of the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter because the parties had not 
sufficiently agreed to the settlement terms. However, this argument is likewise 
unavailing. First, it is immaterial when the settlement agreement was reached. See 
Section II. A. hereof. As a matter of law, the debt arose during the coverage period of the 
insurance policies. Second, CSX's argument is specifically rebutted by the documents 
the parties executed. For example, on August 16, 1991, counsel for SAIC wrote a letter 
to counsel for CSX which read as follows: 
In my August 8, 1991 letter to you, I proposed a lump sum payment 
of $308,000 to settle this matter on behalf of Southern American Insurance 
Company. This proposal is based on a payment schedule which would 
provide for the first 1/3 payment due on October 31, 1991, are [sic] the 
remaining 1/3 payments due on November 31, 1991 [sic] and December 31, 
1991. Please call me if you would like to discuss either the amount or the 
payment schedule which Southern has proposed. 
(R. 468). 
On August 26, 1991, counsel for CSX sent the following response to counsel for 
SAIC: 
CSXT has asked me to convey to you that it is willing to accept 
Southern American's offer of $308,000 to settle CSXT's asbestos coverage 
litigation. CSXT understands that Southern American will make the 
payment in three installations due on October 31, November 30, and 
December 31, 1991, respectively. (I would suggest the first two payments 
be in the amount of $102,667 each and the last in the amount of $102,666.) 
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Please provide me, for CSXT's review, with Southern American's 
proposed settlement documents as soon as possible. 
(R. 469). 
CSX claims that the August 26, 1991 letter did not constitute an unconditional 
acceptance because it proposed different terms as to the amount and time of payment. 
The Liquidator fails to see any difference in the terms. On August 16th, SAIC offered to 
pay CSX $308,000 in one-third installments due at the end of October, November, and 
December. On August 26th, CSX stated it was willing to accept SAIC's offer to pay 
CSX $308,000 in three installments at the end of October, November, and December. 
Any question that SAIC and CSX had reached an agreement prior to October 14, 
1991 is settled by the terms of the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter itself, which states 
in the first sentence, "This will confirm the arrangements agreed to in connection with 
the asbestos-related settlement between [SAIC] and [CSX]. The arrangements that 
have been agreed to are: . . ." , and then the letter goes on to set forth the same payment 
provisions SAIC offered in its August 8, 1991 letter, and CSX accepted in August 26, 
1991 letter. (Emphasis added). 
Third, CSX argues that because the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter created a 
three month payment schedule, SAIC's debt to CSX did not accrue until each payment 
had to be made by SAIC under that schedule, i.e. on October 31, 1991, November 30, 
1991, and December 31, 1991. However, in making this argument, CSX fails to take into 
account that a later compromise of a claim does not affect the time when the debt first 
arises. See In re Upstairs Gallery, Inc., 167 B.R. 915, 918 (9th Cir. BAP 1993). In this 
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case, SAIC's liability to CSX did not arise as a result of the October 14, 1991 Settlement 
Agreement. SAIC's liability to CSX arose because of the issuance, many years earlier, of 
multiple third party insurance policies in favor of CSX. Moreover, CSX filed multiple 
lawsuits against SAIC (also many years earlier) to recover on those insurance policies. 
The October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter merely sets forth the compromise of the parties 
on payment of these pre-existing claims. 
B. CSX Failed to Offer Any Evidence To Support Its Argument That the Debt to 
CSX Was Incurred In the Ordinary Course of Business of SAIC and According 
to Normal Business Terms Within the Insurance Industry. 
CSX also maintains that the payments made by SAIC were incurred in the 
ordinary course of SAIC's business. The sole basis for CSX's argument is that SAIC was 
in the insurance business, and therefore, the arrangements between CSX and SAIC must 
have been ordinary. See Opposition Brief at 31-32. However, the burden of proof was 
on CSX to show that the arrangement was an ordinary one for SAIC and CSX did not 
meet this burden because it did not support its argument with any affidavits, testimony, or 
other evidence. 
To show that the payments were within the ordinary course of business of SAIC 
requires an analysis of SAIC's specific business operations and a determination as to 
whether the type of arrangement entered into between CSX and SAIC was an unusual 
one for SAIC. See Fidelity Sav. & Inv. Co. v. New Hope Baptist, 880 F.2d 1172, 1177 
(10 Cir. 1989) (the court looked to what the debtor did as a regular part of its daily 
business to determine whether a particular transaction was in the ordinary course of that 
debtor's business). CSX presented absolutely no evidence to the trial court regarding 
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SAIC's specific business practices. CSX's unsupported conclusion that the arrangement 
was an ordinary one for SAIC is insufficient as a matter of law. 
CSX also argues, again without any evidentiary support, that the arrangement 
between it and SAIC must have been made according to normal business terms, because 
SAIC was in the insurance business. Under CSX's argument, any settlement 
arrangement involving the acknowledgement of a debt and containing a payment 
schedule would be normal within the insurance industry, no matter how out of the 
ordinary its terms may be. However, at the very least, the determination of whether a 
particular arrangement is normal within an industry requires an analysis of the industry 
itself, and CSX failed to offer any evidence as to normal business practices within the 
insurance industry. 
In any event, CSX cannot overcome the well-established legal principle that debts 
which are paid pursuant to settlement agreements are inherently not normal. See In re 
Meredith Hoffman Partners, 12 F.3d 1549, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993) cert, denied, 512 U.S. 
1206 (1994). Even though insurance companies may review and settle claims as part of 
their every day business, the filing of a lawsuit implies that the insurance claim process 
has broken down. That is the reason a lawsuit is filed. The parties have a disagreement, 
and to resolve that disagreement they bring it before an impartial tribunal. Cases such as 
Meredith Hoffman illustrate that when a lawsuit is filed, it can be presumed as a matter of 
law that the parties are no longer dealing within the ordinary course of their business or 
according to normal business terms within the industry. 
24 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court 
on the new and contemporaneous consideration defense and direct the trial court to grant 
summary judgment in favor of the Liquidator on this issue. If this Court reaches the issue 
of whether the ordinary course defense is applicable in this case, it should rule as a matter 
of law that CSX has failed to establish this defense and remand for the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the Liquidator on this issue. 
DATED this ^ of February, 2002. 
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25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT were mailed, postage prepaid, on this day of February, 2002, to 
the following: 
E. Scott Savage 
Samuel O. Gaufin 
Eric K. Schnibbe 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
629047.03/eam 
